Appendix I. (1/30)
英語原文
In the chapter on the general view of the moods, no appempt was made to asign to either the subjunctive or the optative a single "fundamental idea" from which all the uses of the mood could be derived, except so far as the idea of futurity was shown to belong essentially to the subjunctive in all its most primitive uses. It would be impossible to include under one fundamental idea all the actual uses of any mood in Greek, except the imperative ; for even the indicative is used to express unfulfilled conditions, unaccomplished wished, and unattained purpose, none of which can be brought under the ideas of "declaration" or "absolute assertion" commonly attributed to this mood. Again, it is not to be expected that the true fundamental idea of any mood should include all its uses in a developed language ; for the fortunes of language often depend on causes which are quite independent of the original essence of the forms employed, and which seldom can be referred to invariable laws of thought. The same idea can be expressed in two cognate languages by different moods : as he would have seen is εἶδεν ἄν in Greek and vidisset in Latin, while in Sanskrit it would be expressed by a past augumented future equibalent to Greek ἔμελλεν ὄψεσθαι (see §428). Even within the Greek itself, we have if he were wise expressed by εἰ σοφὸς εἴη in Homer and by εἰ σοφὸς ἦν in Attic ; and in Homer, both οὐκ ἂν ἔγνως and οὐκ ἂν γνοίης can mean you would not have discerned, while the latter can mean also you would not discern (in the same future sense as in Attic).
日本語解釈