Appendix I. (8/30)
英語原文
It is certain that no trace of the subjunctive as a mood of will can be seen in its actual use in conditional sentences. Thus ἢν τὴν πόλινἕλωσι could always be said as properly by the friends as by the enemies of a city, by the besieged as well as by the besiegers. In Il. iii. 71, ὁππότερός κε νικήσῃ, spoken by Priam, is, as expression, perfectly neutral as regards the hope or desire of victory. It may be said with truth, that the primitive meaning of a verbal form is apt to be weakened, or even to disappear, in actual use. But is it logical to assume a lost meaning to account for an expression, when the meaning which remains accounts for it satisfactorily without external help ? When we find ἢν ἕλωσι τὴν πόλιν actually expressing a mere future supposition, with no idea of will, in all periods of the language, and when we find ἕλωσι meaning they will capture in the earliest period that we know, why should we assume an original idea of will (which was afterwards lost) in ἢν ἕλωσι to account for its actual meaning ? The view of conditional sentence here adopted is confirmed by paratactic conditions like the following : θύσεις δὲ τὴν παῖδ᾿· ἔνθα τίνας εὐχὰς ἐρεῖς ; Eur. I.A. 1185, where θύσεις makes a supposition, supposing you shall sacrifice the girl, which would generally be expressed by εἰ θύσεις or ἢν θύσῃς : so ἀδικεῖ τις ἑκών and ἐξήμαρτέ τις ἄκων, both expressing suppositons, Dem. xviii. 274.1
1. See C.F,Hermann, de Protasi Paratactica, p.7.
日本語解釈