Appendix I. (13/30)
英語原文
The whole argument is based on the important assumption that the optative with εἰ, εἰ γάρ, etc. in a wish is the same in origin with the simple optative in a wish, so that εἰ γένοιτο τοῦτο and γένοιτο τοῦτο both come to mean may this be done in the same way, by a wishing power inherent in the optative itself ; and from this it is argued that εἰ γένοιτο το῀το as a protasis is used in a more primitive and natural sense when what is supposed is desired by the speaker than when it is not. Unless we assume this as proved, and reject the opposite alternative which makes the optative with εἰ in a wish a protasis with a supposed apodosis, we have no right to count the examples in 1 and 2 as evidence that the optative with εἰ denotes by its own nature ; for it would be reasoning in a circle to quote these as proof that the optative itself denotes wish, in a discussion which aims at establishing the nature and meaning of the optative in these very expressions. Again, the real nature of the 43 conditions with εἰ and the optative in 4 is in question in this discussion ; and it is inadmissible here to assume at the outset that they express wish in themselves and then to use them as evidence that wishing is the original function of the optative. Proof is needed, therefore, that the optatives in 1, 2, and 4 (that is, in 109 of the 136 wishing optative in Homer)actually express wish by their own force, so that they can properly be used as independent testimony here. Until at least a reasonable presumption in favour of this view is established, we are without evidence that there is any such gradual development of the optative condition as is claimed. We must therefore depend at present on the only cases about which no doubts exist, the complete conditional sentences in 3 and 5, to determine whether the optative with εἰ involves the idea of wish without regard to the nature of its apodosis. If itshould be found that the idea of wish preponderates in these optatives, we should have a convincing proof that hte same is true of the optatives in 1, 2, and 4, whether these are viewed as protases or as original wishes. A slight inspection of Lange's statistics will show that the question is not to be settled in this simple way. Of the 37 optatives in 3, 19 suppose something that is wished for, while 18 do the opposite. Of the 41 in 5, only 8 suppose desirable things, while 33 do not. Therefore, in the 78 plain cases of εἰ with the optative in conditions in Homer, we find only 27 expressing wishes. If we confine ourselves to the cases in 3, where the protasis presedes, we find as equal division as is possible (19 : 18), showing very plainly that even here wish has nothing whatever to do with the form of expression. Indeed, if we take εἰ with the optative in protasis by itself, what is there to indicate that it involves a wish ? It cannot be doubted that this form is the equivalent of English if he should go and if we should see him ; and who would attempt to find any such idea as wish in these expressions ? Unless we are prepared to maintain that if we should be saved expresses the original idea of the English construction better than if we should perish, we must be slow to asser that εἰ σωθεῖμεν gives the spirit of the Greek optative better than εἰ ἀποθάνοιμεν. We must remember also the large class of conditional relative sentences which have the optative. This optative cannot be explained on any different principle from the optative wi εἰ, and yet who would profess to find anything like the idea o wish in ὅ τις ῥέζοι, Od. i. 14, ῳ μὴ εἴη, xi. 490, or in Il. vi. 330, 521, xiii. 344, xiv 248 ? I give the first six examples that I meet.
日本語解釈