Appendix I. (17/30)
英語原文
But it may be said that the peculiar examples of half-formed conditional sentences in 2 (p. 376) establish the theory of the development of the conditional optative out of a wish. But this connecting link loses its value, when it is seen that it connects merely one construction, in which the wishing force of the optative is at least questionable, with another in which there is no positive evidence of any wishing force at all. If the ordinary theory of the suppression of an apodosis with εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο in a wish is correct, we must suppose that the suppressed apodosis was seldom felt in a definite form of words any more than it is with our O if he would come. But it might sometimes happen that an actual expression of a difinite result of the fulfilment of a wish would suit the case better than the uncertain reference to a fulfilment, which the mere clause with if suggests. We have an excellent illustration of this when a wish is represented as a protasis in almost the same words, and is then followed by an apodosis. See Od. iii. 217-223 (quoted in §730), where εἰ γάρ σ᾿ ὣς ἐθέλοι is first a simple wish, and then is repeated as εἰ σ᾿ οὕτως ἐθέλοι, with the apodosis τῷ κέν τις, etc. naturally following. The oft-recurring verse εἴθ᾿ ὣς ἡβώοιμι, βίη δέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἴη appears in Il. xi. 670, xxiii. 629, and Od. xiv. 468 (if Bekker is right in omitting vss. 506-506) as a simple wish with no addition ; but in Il. vii. 157 it stands as a repetition of the wish contained in vss. 132, 133, αἲ γὰρ ἡβῷμ᾿ ὡς. etc., and is followed by the apodosis τῷ κε τάχ᾿ ἀντήσειε μάχης κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ. In the other examples, we have simply the wish O if I were young again, with its vague unexpressed apodosis ; but in Il. vii. 157 the result is expressed in the definite form, then would Hector meet his match. See Od. xvii. 496 and xv. 536 (quoted in §730), in both of which a definite apodosis ecpressing a result takes the place of the usual suppressed conclusion. A distinction of optatives with εἰ into wishes and suppositions, based on the wishing or non-wishing nature of the verb, is often arbitrary. Thus Lange quotes, among his "paratactic" wishes followed by an apodosis in an distinct sentence (that is, half-developed conditional sentences), Il. xvii. 102 :—
εἰ δέ που Αἴαντός γε βοὴν ἀγαθοῖο πυθοίμην,
ἄμφω κ᾿ αὖτις ἰόντες ἐπιμνησαίμεθα χάρμης,
while he gives as an ordinary conditional sentence Il. xxiv. 653 :—
τῶν εἴ τίς σε ἴδοιτο θοὴν διὰ νύκτα μέλαιναν,
αὐτίκ᾿ ἂν ἐξείποι Ἀγαμέμνονι πομένι λαῶν.
His ground for distinction is merely that the former expresses a wish, while the latter does not. Even if both sentences were held to be simply conditional (as they probably are), it would still be claimed that the optative is used in a more legitimate and primitive sense in the former than in the latter. But is not the patent fact that there is really no essential distinction between these two ooptative with εἰ (taken as conditions) a strong argument against the whole doctrine which derives the optative in protasis from the optative in wishes ?
日本語解釈